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Recent Decision
HAUCH V CONNOR-BEGINNING A TRANSITION IN
MARYLAND CONFLICT OF LAWS DOCTRINE?
In dealing with conflict of law problems in tort cases, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has adhered consistently to the doctrine of lex loci
delicti,' refusing to adopt a more modern approach to the resolution of
those conflicts.2 In Hauch v. Connor,3 however, the Court of Appeals held
that the law of the forum, not lex loci delicti, governs a conflict between
the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act, which allows co-employee
tort suits,4 and another state's statute, which bars those actions.5 Although the court characterized Hauch as a workers' compensation case,
rather than a tort action, 6 the court's reasoning suggests that it may be
more receptive to basing choice-of-law decisions on analysis of governmental interests than it maintains.
I.

THE CASE

Connor, McIntire, and Hauch, all Maryland residents, were employed by Hertz Corporation in Maryland.7 In the course of their employment,' the three drove together to Delaware, where their car
1. Lex loci delicti, the "law of the place of wrong," requires a court to apply the law of
the state where the last event necessary to create liability occurred. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378, 384 (1934).
2. White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 352, 223 A.2d 763, 765 (1966) (substantive rights of
Maryland domiciliaries determined by lex loci delicti in tort cases), reajirmed in Frericks v.
General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 296, 336 A.2d 118, 123 (1975) (lex loci delicti applies to
tort cases, but party must give notice of intent to use foreign law). In White the court reviewed criticism of lex loci delicti and arguments advanced to support adoption of the "most
significant relationship" approach enunciated in the Second Restatement, but concluded that
"in the present state of the law, we [should] leave any change in the established doctrine to
the Legislature." 244 Md. at 352-55, 223 A.2d at 767. Se also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971) (listing factors relevant to choice of law in the absence of
statutory directive).
3. 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1957).
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1979) provides that workers' compensation is generally an exclusive remedy; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2363 (1979) permits suit to enforce the
liability of a third-party tortfeasor "other than a natural person in the same employ .
Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981).
6. 295 Md. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210.
7. The parties entered their employment contracts in Maryland, and it was the regular
place of performance. Id. at 121, 453 A.2d at 1208.
8. Id. at 122, 453 A.2d at 1208.
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collided with another. 9 After Connor and Mclntire filed for and received benefits under the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act 0 for
their injuries, they filed suit against Hauch, the driver at the time of the
accident. Treating their claim as a tort claim," the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County followed lex loci delicti' 2 and applied the Delaware statute to bar the suit.' 3 Relying primarily on public policy considerations associated with workers' compensation,' 4 the Court of
Special Appeals reversed and applied Maryland law.' 5
The Court of Appeals expressly reaffirmed its adherence to the doctrine that the law of the place of the wrong governs substantive issues in
tort suits. 16 But when deciding whether Connor and McIntire could
maintain their action at all, the court declined to follow that doctrine.7
In the court's view, the conflict in Hauch concerned not substantive tort
law but the Maryland and Delaware workers' compensation statutes, to
which lex loci delicti does not apply.'" Noting that other jurisdictions,
while continuing to follow lex loci delicti for tort actions generally, have
taken a similar approach, the court applied forum law to workers' compensation cases. i9
The Court of Appeals previously had recognized the importance of

9. On February 6, 1980, Hauch drove her co-employees, Connor and McIntire, from
Baltimore-Washington International Airport to Dover, Delaware, where they were to pick up
rental cars belonging to Hertz Corporation and return them to Maryland. Brief for Appellant at 1, Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). While in Delaware, their car
collided with another car, necessitating emergency medical care in Delaware and more extensive treatment in Maryland. The Delaware driver took no part in this particular case. Brief
for Appellees, Addendum at 2, id.
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 (1957). The parties did not seek workers' compensation
benefits under the Delaware Act. Hauch, 295 Md. at 121, 453 A.2d at 1208.
11. See Connor v. Hauch, Law No. 1100608, mem. op. at 2 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel
County Jan. 27, 1981) (discussion of application of lex loci delicti to the case), rev'd, 50 Md.
App. 217, 437 A.2d 661 (1981), affd, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).
12. The court cited White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), as controlling and
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Connor v. Hauch, Law No. 1100608,
mem. op. at 2-3 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County Jan. 27, 1981), rrv'd, 50 Md. App. 217, 437
A.2d 661 (1981), afd, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).
13. Connor v. Hauch, Law No. 1100608 at 1, 3.
14. Connor v. Hauch, 50 Md. App. 217, 220-25, 437 A.2d 661, 663-65 (1981). The court
discussed the philosophy of workers' compensation laws, and the distinction between employer-employee disputes and employee-employee disputes. The Maryland Act does not immunize co-employees from such suits. Leonard v. Say-a-Stop Serv., Inc., 289 Md. 204, 208,
424 A.2d 336, 337 (1981).
15. Connor, 50 Md. App. at 225, 437 A.2d at 665.
16. Hauch, 295 Md. at 123, 453 A.2d at 1209.
17. Id. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210.
18. Id.
19. "[E]ven in traditional lex loci'delicti jurisdictions, [courts] have applied the workmen's
compensation law of the forum state." Id. at 128, 453 A.2d at 1212.
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public policy considerations in co-employee suits. 2° In tHauch, the court
emphasized the policies of workers' compensation statutes and based its
decision on the presence of "greater Maryland interests."21 Such considerations form the basis of modern choice of law analysis,22 and the
court's discussion resembles an interest-analysis approach to resolving
the choice of law issue.23 Hence, an understanding of the impact of the
decision in Hauch requires an understanding of both lex loci delicti and
interest analysis.
II.

BACKGROUND:

APPROACHES TO CONFLICT OF LAWS

A.

Lex Loci Delicti

The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws outlines a mechanical
approach to resolving conflicts of laws, which consists of specific rules for
determining the applicable law in various types of cases. 24 The rules
derive from the theory of "vested rights" and require courts to apply the
law of the place where the plaintiffs right of action arose.25 Thus, the
20. Id. at 132-33, 453 A.2d at 1213-14.
21. Id. at 133, 453 A.2d at 1214.
22. See infria note 62 and accompanying text.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 152-64.
24. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 225 (1934) ("The validity and effect
of a mortgage on land is determined by the law of the state where the land is.") with id. § 265
("The validity and effect of a mortgage of a chattel are determined by the law of the state
where the chattel is at the time when the mortgage is executed.").
25. Professor Joseph H. Beale developed the "vested rights" theory, according to which
laws protect an individual's interests by creating a right that, in turn, is protected by providing a cause of action for violation of the right. J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 8A.7, at 64 (1935). Beale considered "[t]he primary purpose of law [to be] the creation of rights, and the chief task of the Conflict of Laws to determine the place where a right
arose and the law that created it .... ." Id. § 8A.8, at 64. Consequently, his treatise included extensive rules for choice of law in various areas of law. See, e.g., 1d. Ch. 9, topic 1
(torts); id. Ch. 8 (contracts); id. Ch. 7 (property).
A fundamental criticism of Beale's approach concerned its lack of practical value
because Beale failed to address the actual practice of courts in deciding choice of law
problems. For example, "apparently few courts have directly said that they were enforcing a
foreign-created right. Such expressions are found chiefly in texts." Cook, The LogicalandLegal
Bases of the Confit/t
of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 485 (1924). See W. RICHMAN & W. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 109 (1984) ("[F]irst Sociological Jurisprudence, and
then Legal Realism, had taught that law was and should be functional, and that legal rules
should be tailored to serve societal goals. Because Beale's territorial system did not inquire
into the purposes behind the competing substantive law rules, the system did not satisfy the
mandate of twentieth century jurisprudence.").
The vested rights approach has been criticized also as "oversimplified and inaccurate," especially when a court is trying to choose the applicable law for a tort involving
"wrongful conduct in one state and injurious effects in another." von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 930 (1975). The Restatement attempted
to ameliorate the problem by including specific rules for determining the place of wrong in
various situations. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 note (1934).
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rule for tort cases, lex loci delicti, requires a court to apply the law of the
place where the last act necessary to create liability occurred.2 6 Initially,
courts appreciated this rule because it appeared to provide certainty and
predictability in an otherwise confusing area of the law. 27 Once a court
28
determined where the wrong occurred, it applied that state's law.
The disadvantage of lex loci delicti became apparent when the rule
prevented a forum from recognizing an otherwise cognizable claim because the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred refused to recognize
that claim. 29 This result seemed particularly unfair when all the parties
resided in the forum, but the accident occurred in a state that precluded
recovery.3" In White v. King, 3' for example, two Maryland residents filed
suit for injuries incurred in Michigan when the car in which they were
2
riding, driven by another Maryland resident, went off the road.1
Under Michigan's guest statute, 33 the plaintiffs could recover only by
proving that the defendant was grossly negligent.3 4 Maryland law,
which does not include a guest statute, requires the plaintiff to prove
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 384 (1934).

27. See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 491, 211 A.2d 594, 596 (1965) (adoption of
Second Restatement's approach would "substitute for a rule which was easy of application
one where all manner of gradations of important contacts may be present.").
28. In Hauch v. Connor, the court noted the value of lex loci delicti in providing "predictability and certainty as to which state's tort law will govern." 295 Md. at 125, 453 A.2d at
1210. Additionally, the rule "recognizes the legitimate interests" of the foreign state "in the
form of police protection, medical assistance and highway maintenance . . . whenever an
automobile collision occurs within its borders." Id.
29. Eg., Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 15, 138 So. 414, 415 (1931) (interspousal tort
suit, permitted under laws of marital domicile, dismissed because precluded by law of place of
wrong).
30. See, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892). The
plaintiff's decedent, an Alabama resident employed by an Alabama corporation, was killed in
Mississippi as a result of fellow employees' negligent inspection of train equipment in Alabama. Id. at 127, 11 So. at 803-04. Alabama had an employers' liability statute that would
have permitted an award of damages, but Mississippi law precluded any recovery for the
death. Id. at 128, 11 So. at 805. Although Mississippi's sole contact with the case was that the
decedent suffered his injuries there, the Alabama court applied Mississippi law pursuant to
the rule of lex loci delicti and barred recovery. Id. at 132, 11 So. at 809.
31. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
32. The driver, who had refused one passenger's repeated offers to relieve him, apparently
fell asleep at the wheel after driving almost the entire distance from Maryland to Michigan.
Id. at 358-60, 223 A.2d at 769-70.
33. MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.401 (1970), (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (Callaghan
1960)).
34. The plaintiffs contended that the question whether they were guests or passengers for
hire should have been submitted to the jury. 244 Md. at 351, 223 A.2d at 765. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland found, however, that the plaintiffs were, as a matter of Michigan law,
guests of the defendant. Id. at 356, 223 A.2d at 768. Under the Michigan statute, guests
transported without payment had no cause of action against their hosts in case of an accident,
unless the accident was caused by the host's "gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct." MICH. COMp. LAws § 257.401 (1970) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (Callaghan 1960)).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 43:204

only ordinary negligence.3 5 Reasoning that the certainty afforded by
following the rule of lex loci delicti outweighs the hardships the rule
sometimes causes,3 6 the Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Maryland law should apply. 7 The court also stated its view
that the recommended alternative approach to conflicts of law 38 was not
yet sufficiently developed to warrant judicial adoption. 39 Therefore the
court held that the plaintiffs in Whiie must prove gross negligence, although they would have been able to recover by showing only ordinary
negligence if the accident had occurred in Maryland.4"
The arbitrariness of choosing the law applicable to a suit on the
basis of the location of the underlying occurrence without considering
other relevant aspects of the case4 ' led some courts to use "escape de35. Dashiell v. Moore, 177 Md. 657, 664-65, 11 A.2d 640 (1940); Fitzjarrel v. Boyd, 123
Md. 497, 505, 91 A. 547, 549 (1914).
36. "Hardship may result in a particular case, but that, unfortunately, is true under any
general legal principle. Certainty in the law is not so common that, where it exists, it is to be
lightly discarded." 244 Md. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767. At the same time, the court acknowledged that certainty in the law, at least insofar as its purpose is that people will know the
consequences of their actions, "has little bearing on the commission of unintentional torts."
Id., 223 A.2d at 765.
37. Id.
38. The plaintiffs had urged the court to abandon lex loci delicti in favor of the "most
significant relationship" test enunciated in the Second Restatement. Brief for Appellants at
8, White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). That approach directs the court to
analyze the contacts of each interested state with the accident or the parties, in terms of those
contacts' relative importance, to determine which state's law should govern the issue as to
which the conflict exists. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).
39. In the court's view, the approach to conflicts of laws that should replace lex loci
delicti needed additional time to develop adequately. Consequently, the court felt it preferable to "leave any change in the established doctrine to the Legislature." 244 Md. at 355, 223
A.2d at 767.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has used the Second Restatement's approach to a usury issue in a contract case. Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415
A.2d 1096 (1980). Noting the general practice of recognizing party autonomy in choosing the
law to apply to contracts, the court found further support for giving effect to the parties'
choice of law in the inclusion of a party autonomy provision in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Id. at 43-44, 415 A.2d at 1104-05. The recognition of the
Second Restatement's approach in this instance appears to conflict with the court's usual
refusal to recognize it. However, the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in
Maryland, also provides for party autonomy in choice of law. MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ I-105(l)(1983). Thus, the court could have found, although it did not expressly do so, that
the Maryland legislature has indicated its approval of an approach to resolving conflicts of
law in contract settings that permits party autonomy.
40. See id. at 360, 223 A.2d at 770 (under Michigan law, plaintiffs were guests of
defendant).
41. For example, in Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892),
the negligent act occurred in Alabama, where the plaintiff resided and where the defendant
corporation was incorporated, but the :njuo , occurred in Mississippi. Id. at 127, 11 So. at 80404. Mississippi law imposed no liability on the defendant-employer, while Alabama law provided recovery under its employers' liability act. Id. at 131, 11 So. at 805. The court held
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vices"-manipulative techniques for reaching a more desirable outcome
than lex loci delicti would permit.42 Characterization, public policy,
and the distinction between substance and procedure are the most common escape devices.43
I. Characterization.-Intraditional conflicts analysis, different rules
apply to different areas of law. Thus when deciding which law to apply,
the court first characterizes the case according to the area of law it concerns. When a court chooses one label rather than another to avoid an
undesirable result, it uses its characterization of the case as an escape
device. 44 For example, an injured workers' claim might be considered a
suit in either tort or contract. 45 Under the First Restatement's approach, the law of the place of wrong would apply if the case is viewed
as one in tort,4 6 while the law of the place of the employment contract's
making or of the place of its performance would apply if the action is
viewed as one in contract.4 7 If lex loci delicti would preclude recovery,
but lex locus contractus would not, a court might characterize the case
as a contract action to avoid the undesirable result of using lex loci
delicti.48 Because the court has discretion to determine whether a case
concerns contract or tort, it may manipulate the outcome of each case
by selecting the characterization which yields the preferred result.

2. Substance orprocedure.-By characterizing an issue as procedural or
substantive, the courts often employ a variant of the characterization
escape device. Rather than describe an issue in terms of an area of law
(e.g., as a suit in contract rather that tort), the court decides whether an
that the plaintiff had no cause of action because the law of Mississippi governed the suit. Id.
at 140, 11 So. at 809.
42. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 89 (3d ed. 1977) ("the true explanation
of manipulative cover-ups. . . is that the court is seeking a just result in the particular case").
43. These are not by any means the only escape devices courts use, however. A court
may, for example, employ renvoi to avoid applying the substantive tort law of the place of
wrong. Renvoi involves the court's looking at the choice-of-law rules, as well as the substantive law, of the place of the accident. If those rules refer the issue to the forum state's law, the
court is able to apply its own substantive law. Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1166-70 (1938).
44. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.14, at 294 (2d ed.
1980).
45. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 42, at § 160. The tort characterization emphasizes the
injury, while the contract label focuses on the employer-employee relationship.
46. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 378, 384 (1934).
47. Id. at § 311 (law governing questions of validity of contract); id. at § 355 (law governing question of performance).
48. Eg., Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Ref. Co., 47 F.2d 615 (D. Kan. 1930).
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issue is one of substantive or procedural law. 49 Forum law governs procedural issues; territorial rules govern issues of substantive law.50 The
application of statutes of limitation illustrates the potential for manipulation of this distinction. Although such statutes are usually considered
to be procedural, 5 ' the time limitation of a wrongful death statute is
generally considered to be a substantive rule for choice of law purposes.12 The justification for the distinction is that the limitation on the
wrongful death action qualifies a statutorily created right, but the usual
statute of limitations affects only a remedy.5" By that kind of reasoning,
a court could declare that a particular statute of limitation qualifies a
right and thus is a substantive issue governed by the law of the place of
an occurrence or, conversely, that it only affects a remedy and thus is a
procedural issue governed by forum law.54
49. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 44, at § 3.2C; G. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 155 (2d
ed. 1951).
50. Choice-of-law rules such as lex loci delicti determine which state's law governs substantive law issues; characterization of an issue as procedural avoids application of choice-oflaw rules altogether. See G. STUMBERG, supra note 49, at 134.
51. R. WEINTRAUB, Supra note 44, § 3.2C2 at 59; G. STUMBERG, supra note 49, at 147-49.
52. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 605 comment a (1934).
53. The Rhode Island Supreme Court expressed this view as follows:
Where a statute creates an entirely new right of action that did not exist at common
law and expressly attaches thereto, without any exception, a proviso that the action
shall be brought within a specified time, such proviso ordinarily will be construed as
a condition imposed upon the created right of action and not merely as a statute of
limitations affecting the remedy only.
Tillinghast v. Reed, 70 R.I. 259, 263, 38 A.2d 782, 783 (1944).
Whether a particular statute of limitations is enacted with legislation creating a right
of action or as a separate statute, the general purpose of limitations is to preclude suits on
stale claims. See Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 75, 394 A.2d 299, 302
(1978) (rationale underlying statutes of limitations includes encouraging promptness in instituting actions, suppressing stale or fraudulent claims, and avoiding inconvenience). Moreover, the rule that procedural issues are governed by the law of the forum is based on the
virtual impossibility of importing foreign procedure into a court. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. 12 introductory note (1934). The difficulty of applying another state's
statute of limitations, however, is neither greater nor less whether the statute is general or
specific. Thus, the distinction between statutes that qualify rights and those that only affect
remedies is artificial at best.
54. For example, the Second Circuit stated that a statute of limitations is substantive
rather than procedural if "the limitation is 'directed to the newly created liability so speciica/ly as to warrant saying that it qualified the right.' " Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,
220 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1955) (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904)) (emphasis
in original).
Survival statutes, similarly, have been treated both as procedural and as substantive.
In Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691 (1928), a Connecticut resident was injured in
New York, but the defendant died before the plaintiff brought suit. Id. at 175, 139 A. at 69192. Connecticut, the forum state, would have allowed the plaintiff to bring his suit against
the defendant's estate. Under New York law, which did not include a survival statute the
cause of action no longer existed upon the death of a party. Id. at 175-76, 139 A. at 692. The
Connecticut court treated the issue as one governed by the lex loci delicti, stating:
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3. Pubh'c Policy.-A court that uses public policy as an escape device
asserts that the foreign law is so contrary to local public policy that the

forum is justified in refusing to apply the other state's law.55 In a case
involving only residents of the forum, a court may decide that applying
lex loci delicti would eliminate a protection to which its citizens are entitled. For example, in Mertz v. Mertz5 6 a wife sued her husband in their
home state for injuries received in another state. Forum law precluded
interspousal suits, but the place of wrong allowed them.5 7 The application of lex loci delicti would violate the public policy of the forum-a
resident would be denied the protection from suit that the state sought
to promote. 58 Reasoning that any change in the rule should be made by
the legislature 59 and that courts may not refuse to give effect to expressed public policy, 60 the court refused to permit the suit.61
B.

Interest Analysz

A court that is applying interest analysis 62 considers the various
policies behind the conflicting laws and each state's interest in promotNew York created the right of action for this wrong. The power which gave the
right could take it away. When by its law the death of the injuring person abated
the right of action for this wrong, the right no longer existed in that jurisdiction, nor
thereafter in any other jurisdiction.
Id. at 178, 139 A. at 692.
The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, held survival statutes to be concerned with procedures for enforcing legal claims and governed, therefore, by forum law.
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953). Under the law of Arizona,
the place of the accident giving rise to the suit, the action would have been barred, because
commenced after the tortfeasor's death. Id. at 862, 264 P.2d at 946.
55. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 44, at § 3.6.
56. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
57. Id. at 469, 3 N.E.2d at 597-98.
58. New York, the forum state, based its refusal to entertain -tort suits between spouses on
the common law unity of husband and wife. Id., 3 N.E.2d at 598. Of course, by protecting
the husband from suit by the wife, the court precluded recovery by the wife, who was also a
New York resident.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 471-73, 3 N.E.2d at 598-99.
61. Id. at 473-74, 3 N.E.2d at 600.
62. Brainerd Currie presented this approach to conflict of laws in Currie, Married Women's
Contracts: A Study tn Conf'ct-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cmi. L. REv. 227, 232-33 (1958). Professor
Currie suggested that forum law be applied in any case of a true conflict. See inla note 67.
Subsequent theorists who developed other forms of modern analysis similarly focused on the
interests of each state in the resolution of a case. For example, Judge Fuld, writing for the
New York Court of Appeals, expressed the opinion that "[jiustice, fairness and the 'best practical result' . . . may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation." Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (1963)(citation omitted). Professor Leflar suggested that courts consider choice-influencing factors, including predictabil-
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ing those policies in the particular case.63 The central feature of interest
analysis is the distinction between "true" and "false" conflicts.
1. True Confict.-A true conflict exists if some policy of each state
would be furthered by applying its rule to the case, and the promotion
of either state's statutory or common-law policy would adversely affect
the other state's interest in promotion of its own policy.6 4 The court
may resolve the conflict by applying forum law,6 5 on the grounds that
no good reason exists for applying the other state's law6 6 and that because the court is more familiar with the policy of its own state, it can
more accurately promote that policy.67 Alternatively, the court may
continue its analysis of the true conflict to determine which state's interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied6" and then apply
the law of that state. 69 The "comparative impairment" approach allows
the court to distinguish between two interested states on the strength of
their respective interests and thereby assures application of the law of
the state with the greater interest.7 °
Lihenthal v. Kaufman7 ' illustrates the use of interest analysis to resolve a true conflict by application of a forum's law. Defendant, an Oregon resident, had executed and delivered two promissory notes in
California.7 2 An Oregon court previously had declared the defendant a

ity, simplicity, and advancement of the forum's interests, in selecting the "better law" to
apply to an issue. LEFLAR, supra note 42, at § 96.
63. This focus derives from Brainerd Currie's view of law as purposive in nature; that is,
the laws of a jurisdiction are intended to achieve particular goals in society. Currie, On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 1017 (1958).
64. Currie, supra note 62, at 251-52.
65. This is the resolution that Currie, who opposed courts' balancing of state interests,
recommended. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law. Governmental Interests and the JudcialFunction, 26 U. CHi. L. REv. 9, 77 (1958) ("[C]hoice between the competing interests of
coordinate states is a political function of a high order, which ought not, in a democracy, to
be committed to the judiciary ....
"); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DUKE LJ. 171, 176 ("[A]ssessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states ... is a political function of a very high order. This is
a function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function that the
courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack the necessary resources.").
66. Currie, supra note 62, at 261.
67. Currie stated that a court should apply forum law to a true conflict because "[i]n this
way it can be sure at least that it is consistently advancing the policy of its own state." Id.
This statement seems to suggest, conversely, that the court's unfamiliarity with foreign law
impairs its ability to advance the policy of the other state.
68. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1963).
69. Id.
70. For an example of the comparative-impairment technique's application, see id. at 1214.
71. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
72. Id. at 2-3, 395 P.2d at 544-45.
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spendthrift and thus the transactions were void under Oregon law. But
California law did not recognize the disability of a spendthrift and
would have enforced payment of the notes.7" Seeking enforcement of
the notes in Oregon, the plaintiff argued that under the doctrine of lex
locus contractus California law should govern the action.74 After examining the policies of each state, 75 the court concluded that a true conflict
existed. 76 Applying California law to uphold the validity of the notes
would undermine Oregon's interests in preventing spendthrifts from becoming public charges and in protecting their families.7 7 Similarly, if
Oregon law applied to void the transaction, California's interest in promoting creditors' rights would be adversely affected. 78 The choice of
either state's law would advance one state's policy while harming the
other's policy. The court applied Oregon (forum) law, because the "interests of neither jurisdiction are clearly more important than those of
the other."79
A true conflict also existed in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,8° and the
California court, rather than applying the law of the forum, used comparative-impairment analysis to choose the applicable law. Two California residents had driven to a night club in Nevada,8 ' become
intoxicated, and driven back to California, where they collided with a
motorcycle. The injured driver of the motorcycle, also a California resident, sued the Nevada tavern keeper.8 2 California law would allow the
suit, in furtherance of the state's policy of promoting safety on its high-

73. Id. at 3-6, 395 P.2d at 545.
74. California was both the place of the contracts' making, because the notes were executed and delivered there, and of their performance, because the defendant was to pay the
notes there. Id. at 7-8, 395 P.2d at 545-46.
75. Id. at 14-16, 395 P.2d at 548-49. Oregon had interests in protecting the spendthrift's
family, in protecting the public from the expenses incurred if the spendthrift (and his family)
had become a public charge, in "protecting innocent persons from fraud," and in promoting
a reputation for honoring agreements. Id. at 14-15, 395 P.2d at 548-49. California had interests in "having its citizen creditor paid" and in promoting enforceability of its contracts. Id.
at 15, 395 P.2d at 549.
76. Id. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
77. See supra note 75.
78. See supra text accompanying note 64.
79. 239 Or. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
80. 16 Cal.3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
81. The Nevada night club had solicited California patrons in advertisements to which
the California couple responded. They spent the evening at the bar and reached a point of
intoxication that made them incapable of driving home safely. The bar continued to serve
them, and on their way home they collided with the plaintiff. Id. at 315-16, 546 P.2d at 720,
128 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
82. Plaintiff asserted that defendant was negligent in continuing to serve persons who
were already intoxicated, and that defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries. Id. at 316, 546 P.2d at 720, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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ways. 8 3 Nevada law precluded dramshop actions, because its policy was
to protect tavern keepers from liability resulting from a customer's negligence.8 4 Because the plaintiff was a California driver and the defendant
was a Nevada tavern keeper, application of either state's law to protect
its own resident would harm the other state's interest.85
The court concluded that applying Nevada law would impair California's interests more than applying California's law would impair Nevada's interests.86 Because Nevada law already imposed criminal
liability on bartenders for serving an obviously intoxicated person, the
imposition of civil liability would not prohibit any conduct that was not
already prohibited; in other words, the standard of conduct would not
be changed.8 7 In addition, California could not effectively promote its
policy of safety on its highways if bartenders outside the state were exempt from liability although they actively solicited the business of California residents.8 8 Thus, the court concluded that California's interest
in having its law applied was greater.
2. False Conflict.-A false conflict exists when only one state is interested in having its law applied to the case.89 If the application of one
state's law would advance its interest without adversely affecting the
other state's interest, the court applies the law of the state whose interests will be advanced.9 If the application of one state's law would not
advance its own policy but would undermine the interest of the other
state,9 1 the court applies the law of the state whose interest would be
injured. That is, if only one state's interest will be affected, no matter
which state's law the court applies, the apparent conflict is a false one,
and the court applies the law of the affected state.

83. Id. at 317, 546 P.2d at 721, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
84. Id. at 318, 546 P.2d at 721, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
85. Application of California law, by allowing its resident to sue, would further its policy
of promoting safety on its highways but would undermine the protection ordinarily given to a
Nevada tavern keeper. Similarly, applying Nevada law would protect its resident bartender
but also would subvert California's interest in safe highways.
86. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
87. Id., 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
88. Id. at 322-23, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
89. Currie, supra note 62 at 251-52; R. LEFLAR, supra note 42, § 93, at 187.
90. Currie, supra note 62 at 251-52.
91. Currie stated the false conflict situations in pairs:
Domestic interest advanced without detriment to foreign interests
Foreign interest advanced without detriment to domestic interests
Foreign interest subverted with no advancement of domestic interests
Domestic interest subverted without advancement of foreign interests
Id. at 242, table 6, groups I and II, V and VI.
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In Babcock v. Jackson,92 the Court of Appeals of New York was
presented with a false conflict. Three New York residents were injured
in an automobile accident in Ontario.9 3 The Ontario guest statute
barred recovery by the passengers against the driver, while New York
encouraged such claims. 94 The policy behind the Ontario statute was to
prevent fraud and collusion against insurance companies. 95 Because
those interests would be advanced only when the accident involved Ontario residents, no Ontario interest would be advanced by applying its
law to New York residents.96 On the other hand, New York policy
would be advanced by application of its law, because that would promote the recovery intended for its residents.9 7 Hence, the court applied
New York law.9"
III.

ANALYSIS

The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Hauch v. Connor may be the
first step in a transition from adherence to the rigid rule of lex loci
delicti to adoption of interest analysis for resolution of choice-of-law
problems.9 9 The court refused to characterize the issue for which a rule
was to be chosen as a tort issue and used "public policy" as a device to
avoid following lex loci delicti.i" The court relied largely on cases that
had been decided by means of interest analysis. t 1 ' And finally, the
court reached the same result that that modern analysis would have
yielded. 0 2
A.

Use of Escape Devices

The Court of Appeals asserted that Hauch v. Connor was a workers'
92. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
93. Id. at 476-77, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
94. Id. at 482-83, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
95. The statute was intended to prevent a driver and a passenger from "manufacturing"
a claim against the driver's insurance company. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751. The case presented a false
conflict. The application of New York law would advance its policy and have no adverse
effect on Ontario's interest; application of Ontario law would not further its interest but
would injure New York policy. See supra text accompanying note 90.
98. 12 N.Y.2d at 484-85, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
99. The court asserted its continued adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti, holding that
Delaware law would govern all issues of substantive tort law in the case. 295 Md. 120, 12325, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209-10. But the court also held that lex loci delicti was inapplicable to
the issue of whether the plaintiffs could bring suit in Maryland. Id. at 134, 453 A.2d at 1214.
100. See ihla notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 130, 138 and accompanying text.
102. See infta text accompanying notes 152-64.
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compensation case, not a tort case.103 That characterization allowed the
court to avoid the rule of White v. King, 04 which would have required
the application of Delaware law to bar the suit.10 5 However, the facts in
Hauch are those of a fairly ordinary tort action-automobile passengers
sued their driver for injuries allegedly caused by the driver's negligence. 10 6 Although the Maryland statute permitted the plaintiffs to receive workers' compensation benefits, 0 7 Hauch is not a typical workers'
compensation case. A typical case would be a suit by the injured worker
against his employer; indeed, workers' compensation statutes were en08
acted to remove common-law bars to recovery from an employer.1
But those bars did not preclude the worker's recovery in an action
against a third party, including a fellow employee, whose negligence
caused the injury."0 9 Thus, the Court of Appeals has stated that the
Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act provision dealing with actions
against third-party tortfeasors did not create a new right of action, but
only governs the exercise of the pre-existing right." 0
The court's characterization of Hauch as a workers' compensation
case removed it from areas of clearly established Maryland doctrine regarding choice of law and allowed the court to reach the result indicated

103. 295 Md. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210.
104. 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2304, 2363 (1979); Groves v. Marvel, 59 Del. 73, 213 A.2d
853 (1965) (person employed by same employer is a "co-employee" included within statutory
immunity of the workers' compensation law).
106. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying note 10.
108. At common law, an injured employee had to prove that:
[T]he injury was due solely to the negligence of the employer, and he was confronted with the harsh defenses of contributory negligence, negligence of his fellowservant and assumption of risk. The employee and his dependents frequently failed
to secure a verdict because of the difficulty in establishing the liability of the employer, without any fault on his [the employee] part, thus resulting in financial
hardship. The employer . . . was subject to high monetary verdicts.
M. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 1-1, at I (2d ed. 1977). The
Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act was expressly designed to counteract those
problems. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, preamble (1957).
Workers' compensation statutes generally operate as a form of compromise between
employer and employee, in that the employer agrees to provide certain compensation for the
injured employee, who agrees in return to waive his common law right to sue his employer.
Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The workers' compensation statute is, in effect, an incidental term of the employment contract. See Hunyadi v.
Stratfield Hotel, 143 Conn. 77, 84, 119 A.2d 321, 324 (1955) (employees' "right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act issues from their contract with their
employer").
109. M. PRESSMAN, supra note 108, at § 6-2(1).
110. Taylor v. State, 233 Md. 406, 411, 197 A.2d 116, 118 (1964).
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by public-policy analysis."' To support its consideration of public policy, the court relied on its previous decision in Hutzell v. Boyer. " 2 In that
case, the Court of Appeals found Virginia's workers' compensation statute, which bars co-employee suits, obnoxious to Maryland's policy of
promoting tort recovery to prevent injured persons from becoming public charges." 3 Consequently, the court applied Maryland law and permitted the action.'"' But in Hutzell the accident causing the plaintiff's
injuries had occurred in Maryland;" 5 thus, lex loci delicti also required
application of Maryland law to the suit."16 In contrast, the Hauch
court's public-policy analysis resulted in the application of Maryland
law although lex loci delicti would have required that Delaware law be
applied. 7
Moreover, the court's discussion in Hutzell referred to the workers'
compensation statute as an issue related to the co-employee tort action,
but did not treat the action as one distinct from tort. "1 In contrast,
Delaware treats workers' compensation as an area distinct from tort." 9
Hence, the Maryland court characterized Hauch v. Connor as a Delaware
court would have done had the suit been filed in Delaware; however, the
characterization to be applied to a particular case is ordinarily a matter

111. The court noted that "[t]he rule oflex locide&ti is well established in Maryland." 295
Md. at 123, 453 A.2d at 1209. Thus, if the court had characterized the issue as one of tort
law, it probably would not have considered public policy, since the established choice-of-law
rule would have dictated the court's decision.
112. 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969).
113. Id. at 233, 249 A.2d at 452.
114. Id.
115. Using a company truck, the parties drove each day from their homes in Maryland to
their job in Virginia. As the parties returned home one afternoon, defendant Hutzell fell
asleep at the wheel, and the truck went off the road in Maryland, hitting a utility pole. Id. at
229-30, 249 A.2d at 450-51.
116. Id. at 232, 249 A.2d at 452.
117. See supra text accompanying note 26. The court extended its public-policy rationale
by analogizing workers' compensation acts to statutes of limitations, which also are generally
governed by forum law. In the court's view, "Although the rationale often given for the rule
that the law of the forum governs the applicable statute of limitations is that the matter is
'procedural' ... the better reason is that it implicates the public policy of the forum rather
than the public policy of another jurisdiction." 295 Md. at 133 n.10, 453 A.2d at 1214 n.10.
Under this reasoning, almost any statute could fit into the analogy and, therefore,
allow a court to apply forum law. For example, the existence of a guest statute reflects a
state's policy of protecting drivers from lawsuits against them by their passengers. See Currie,
Conf'ct, Criis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 36 ("The guest statute expresses
[the state's] policy for the protection of defendants.").
118. 252 Md. at 232-33, 249 A.2d at 452.
119. See, e.g., Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981)
(because workers' compensation is sole remedy available for injuries covered by Workmen's
Compensation Act, employee may not sue co-employee for those injuries).
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of forum law. 2 ' The court's use of the Delaware characterization of
workers' compensation and the discussion of public policy in Hauch thus
operated as escape devices to allow the court to avoid the unjust result
that would have been mandated by lex loci delicti.
Before adopting modern analysis as an approach to conflict-of-laws
issues, the New York Court of Appeals similarly used escape devices to
avoid the effect of lex loci delicti.121 In Kilberg v. Northeast Airh'nes,
Inc.,122 for example, the court avoided a damages limitation it considered "unfair and anachronistic"'' 23 by applying forum law to the damages issue in a wrongful death action. 24 The plaintiffs decedent had
died in an airplane crash in Massachusetts, and that state's wrongful
death statute limited recovery to a maximum of $15,000.125 The New
York court acknowledged that wrongful death actions, which are cre26
ated by statute, are governed by the law of the place of the wrong.'
But the court noted the injustice and anomalism of subjecting New York
citizens to the vagaries of the laws of other states on the basis of the mere
fortuity of the place of injury.' 27 Further, New York law contained a
clear statement of its policy not to limit the damages that are recoverable for wrongful death. 2 Therefore, the court concluded that it

120. See supra text accompanying note 48; ef infra note 129 (whether an issue relates to
substantive or procedural law is a matter governed by forum law).
121. The New York court adopted modern analysis in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The parties to that case had travelled from New
York to Ontario, where their car went off the road and collided with a stone wall. Ontario
had a guest statute and, therefore, precluded a tort action against the driver by the passengers
for their injuries. New York, the place of their residence, however, allowed these suits. Id. at
476-77, 191 N.E.2d at 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745. Application of New York's law would advance its policy of promoting recovery for tort victims without undermining Ontario's policy
of protecting its residents from collusive suits. On the other hand, application of Ontario's
law would undermine New York's policy without advancing that of Ontario. Id. at 482-83,
191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. Therefore, the court applied New York law and
permitted the suit to go forward. d. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 752. The
case, of course, presented a false conflict. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
122. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). This case was decided after
the court rejected lex loci delicti and adopted a center of gravity approach in Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954). The court later considered the policy interests
of each state involved in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-84, 191 N.E.2d 279, 184-85,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750-52 (1963).
123. Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
124. Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
125. Id. at 38, 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
126. Id., 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
127. The court noted that an air traveler may pass over any number of states and that an
air crash may occur within the boundaries of any of them. A crash may even occur within the
boundaries of a state not on the aircraft's scheduled route, if it leaves its course. Id. at 39, 172
N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
128. Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.

HA UCH v. CONNOR

1984]

should treat the measure of damages as a procedural matter governed
by New York law.' 2 '
B.

Use of Interest-Anaysis Cases

The Court of Appeals supported its decision in Hauch v. Connor by
pointing to two other states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, that have
applied forum law to tort suits between co-employees arising from accidents outside the forum. In both of those cases, the courts determined
which law to apply by analyzing the interests of each state concerned.
In Simaitis v. Flood' the Supreme Court of Connecticut expressly
applied a form of interest analysis13 ' and rejected the traditional rules
urged on it by both plaintiff and defendant.1 3 2 Instead, the court identified and considered the respective interests of Connecticut, which was
the forum, the domicile, and the workplace of both parties, and of Tennessee, which was the location of the accident.1 33 Connecticut's interests
in fully compensating injured workers and in reimbursing employers
who had paid compensation for injuries caused by third parties would
be advanced by application of its law. 134 Tennessee's interest in limiting
the liability of its resident employers and co-employees, on the other
hand, would not be advanced by application of its law. 135 Consequently, Connecticut's interest in the case was greater than Tennes1 37
see's, 136 and the Connecticut court applied forum law.

129. The court also noted that the question whether a particular issue relates to substantive or procedural law is itself a matter governed by forum law. Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at
529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
130. 182 Conn. 24, 437 A.2d 828 (1980).
131. Id. at -, 437 A.2d at 832.
132. The plaintiff argued that the case should be viewed as one in contract and, thus, that
Connecticut law should apply. The court rejected this approach for several reasons. First, it
would preclude "successive incremental awards." Second, an employer could avoid liability
by selecting where to make the employment contract; an employer would choose a place
where the law favored him and not the employee. Last, co-employees do not have a contract
with each other, so the approach was not appropriate in these suits. 182 Conn. at 28, 437
A.2d at 830-31.
The defendant argued that tort choice of law applied and, therefore, Tennessee law
governed under lex loci delicti. The court rejected this approach because of general dissatisfaction with the doctrine, noting that it could result in temporary visitors to Connecticut
receiving benefits, while Connecticut residents injured outside the state would have no remedy. Id. at 29, 437 A.2d at 831.
133. Id. at 31, 437 A.2d at 832-33.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The court concluded that "Tennessee has no legitimate interest in preventing Connecticut from providing the injured employee with a right of action for damages against a
third party ....
" Id. Because application of Tennessee law would not advance its policy,
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Similarly, in Saharceskiv. Marcure,'3 8 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts looked to the interests of each state with a connection to
the suit, as shown by the parties' relationship to the state and their expectations concerning their legal rights.' 3 9 The other state concerned,
Connecticut, had no connection to the case except that it was the location of the accident."4 Noting that Massachusetts was the place of employment and the domicile of the parties,14' the Massachusetts court
discounted the connection between the litigation and Connecticut as
merely fortuitous.' 4 2 Applying Massachusetts law would not harm Connecticut's interest because no Connecticut resident would be precluded
from bringing suit.' 43 In contrast, the Massachusetts policy of limiting
recovery for injuries caused by a co-employee to the statutory workers'
compensation benefits would be undermined by application of Connecticut law. 44 Furthermore, because the employment contracts were made
in Massachusetts, where co-employee suits for injuries incurred in the
course of employment were barred, 45 the parties could have had no
but use of Connecticut law would further its interest in compensating resident employees, the
case was a false conflict. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
This formulation could apply just as easily to a guest statute case. For example, using
the facts of White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), one could state that "[Michigan] has no legitimte interest in preventing [Maryland] from providing the injured [passenger] with a right of action for damages against [the driver]" especially when the parties live
and work and maintain their relationship in Maryland. The facts in Hauch fit even more
neatly into the model:
[Delaware] has no legitimate interest in preventing [Maryland] from providing the
injured employee with a right of action for damages against a third party, particularly where both the employee and the alleged tortfeasor are [Maryland residents
• . . the employee was hired and is principally employed in [Maryland].
137. 182 Conn. at 31, 437 A.2d at 832-33.
138. 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977). In this case, the plaintiff sought application
of the lex loci delicti, Connecticut, which would allow a co-employee suit. The defendant
argued that the law of the place where the employment contract was made, Massachusetts,
governed the case and precluded the suit. Id. at 305-07, 366 N.E.2d at 1246-47.
139. The court appeared to combine elements of interest analysis and the most significant
relationship test, looking at the interest of each state as determined by such factors as the
relationship of the parties and their expectations. Id. at 308-12, 366 N.E.2d at 1248-49.
140. Id. at 305-06, 366 N.E.2d at 1246.
141. ld. at 306-08, 366 N.E.2d at 1247. The parties were driving through Connecticut in
the course of their employment with a Massachusetts corporation. The employer had no
store in Connecticut, although its employees occasionally went to that state to pick up merchandise. Id. at 305, 366 N.E.2d at 1246.
142. Id. at 311, 366 N.E.2d at 1249.
143. Because the employees concerned lived and worked in Massachusetts, no Connecticut
employee was being prevented from bringing suit. Furthermore, the Massachusetts employees had no expectation of a right to sue because they entered into their employment contracts
in Massachusetts, where co-employee suits are barred. Id.
144. Id.
145. These factors closely resemble factors set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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expectation of either a right to proceed against or a potential liability to
co-employees. As a result, the Massachusetts court concluded that forum law should govern the case. 146
The Maryland court's reliance on these cases in Hauch may signal
its willingness to go beyond a rigid application of inflexible choice-oflaw rules to reach a just result. Like the Connecticut and Massachusetts
courts, the Maryland court phrased its conclusion in the language of
interest analysis. ' 47 Noting the relation between the parties and Maryland,14 the Court of Appeals concluded that "there are greater Maryland interests" in the outcome of the case." 9 On the basis of that
conclusion, which expresses the fundamental concern of interest analysis, 150 the court held that Maryland law governed the case. 151
C

Interest Analysis Applied to Hauch v. Connor

If the Court of Appeals had expressly adopted interest analysis, the
court would have resolved the choice-of-law question in Hauch in the
same way as the court actually did. Further, interest analysis of the case
would have been similar to the court's actual opinion, because interest
analysis would have focused on the public policies to be served by the
application of either state's law.' 5 2 But analysis of the actual governmental interests involved would have produced a more precisely reasoned opinion. Interest analysis would have required the court to
enunciate clearly the policies that underlie the workers' compensation
statute. 153
When applying interest analysis, the court first must identify the
source of the conflict between the laws of the states concerned by identifying the policies the laws promote.1 54 The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act permits suits by injured workers against third parties,
including their co-employees, to promote full compensation for injuries. 155 Recognizing that workers' compensation benefits often provide
146. 373 Mass. at 316, 366 N.E.2d at 1252.
147. 295 Md. at 133, 453 A.2d at 1214.
148. The parties reside in Maryland, their place of employement is Maryland, and they
filed claims for benefits under the Maryland Act. 295 Md. at 133-34, 453 A.2d at 1214.
149. Id. at 133, 453 A.2d at 1214.
150. See supra text accompanying note 62.
151. 295 Md. at 134, 453 A.2d at 1214.
152. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
153. Although the court repeatedly asserted the importance of public-policy considerations
to choice of law in workers' compensation cases, it never expressly stated the policies with
which it was concerned. See Hauch, 295 Md. at 127, 132, 133, 453 A.2d at 1211, 1214.
154. See Currie, supra note 62 at 231-33.
155. The Court of Special Appeals has interpreted MD.ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1957) as
intending "that an injured employee may, by the combined result of his compensation claim

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 43:204

only limited relief, the Maryland statute "is designed to protect workers
and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries."15' 6
In addition, the statute seeks to prevent Maryland taxpayers from
becoming financially responsible for the care of injured workers.' 5 7 The
Delaware prohibition of suits on work-related injuries is intended "to
provide a scheme for assured compensation for work-related injuries
without regard to fault and to relieve employers and employees of the
expenses and uncertainties of civil litigation."' 58
The second step in applying interest analysis to a choice-of-law
problem is to determine whether both, or only one, state's interests
would be affected by the outcome of the case-that is, whether the case
presents a "true" or a "false" conflict.' 5 9 In Hauch, the apparent conflict
was a false one, because only Maryland's public policy would be affected by the outcome of the case. Because none of the parties lived or
worked in Delaware,'" Delaware had no interest in protecting them
from "the expenses and uncertainties of civil litigation."''
Moreover,
the provision of emergency medical care in Delaware created at least a
minimal interest in compensating the hospital.' 62 Consequently, Delaware's interests would not be advanced by application of Delaware law
or harmed by application of Maryland law.
Maryland, however, had a substantial interest in the legal effects of
the parties' employment, because they had made their employment contracts and were regularly employed in Maryland.' 6 3 Additionally, because the plaintiffs were Maryland residents, Maryland taxpayers would
provide financially for the plaintiffs if they were not fully compensated
for their injuries." 6 Therefore, application of Delaware law precluding

and a proceeding against a negligent third party, recover more than he could recover under
the Act ....
" Brocker Mfg. v. Mashburn, 17 Md. App. 327, 337, 301 A.2d 501, 506 (1973).
156. Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343, 412 A.2d 733, 734 (1980).
157. Paul v. Glidden Co., 184 Md. 114, 119, 39 A.2d 544, 546 (1944).
158. Kofron v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 1982). Although the court in
Kofton only referred to an employer's immunity from suit, Groves v. Marvel, 59 Del. 73, 213
A.2d 853 (1965), had previously established that co-employees enjoyed the same immunity
from suit. A further purpose of providing workers' compensation is "to shift the cost of employment injuries to the consumer as part of the cost of production." Price v. All Am. Eng'g
Co., 320 A.2d 336, 341 (Del. 1974).
159. See supra notes 62, 89-91 and accompanying text.
160. See supra text accompanying note 7.
161. See supra note 158.
162. 295 Md. at 122, 453 A.2d at 1208.
163. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The Maryland Workmen's Compensation
Act is intended to protect all workers regularly employed in Maryland. MD. ANN. CODE art.
101, § 21 (1957).
164. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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the suit would have directly contravened Maryland's interests in compensating injured workers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Hauch v. Connor the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced the issue
of whether Maryland residents may sue a co-employee, who is also a
Maryland resident, for injuries that were incurred in a state that precludes such suits. Focusing on public-policy considerations of the kind
central to interest analysis, the court reached a more equitable result
than application of traditional choice-of-law rules would have permitted. Although the court asserted its continued adherence to lex loci
delicti in tort cases generally, it used common escape devices to avoid
applying that rule in Hauch and supported its decision largely by reference to cases decided on the basis of interest analysis. In future conflict
of laws cases, the Maryland court should continue to look beyond
mechanical application of rigid rules to consider the policies behind the
laws that it is asked to apply. This approach would allow the court
consistently to reach decisions that comport both with the genuine interests of the states concerned and with justice between the parties.

